Phishing attacks know no boundaries... or limits

People are used to the idea of phishing attacks showing up in their email, but in glowing testament to the creativity of potential attackers, Twitter recently has seen a rash of phishing attacks through Twitter's "direct messaging" feature.

The attack plays out like this: someone on your Twitter followers list sends you a direct message saying, "hey! check out this funny blog about you... " with a hyperlink to a website, "" . Clicking on the hyperlink takes you to a website that redirects to a webpage containing what looks like the Twitter login page. This is an attempt to get you to fill in your username, and more importantly, your password.

Needless to say, I'd avoid it. If you do get suckered in (hey, I admit it, I did), make sure to change your password immediately after.

What I find fascinating about this attack is that the direct messages come from people that are on my followers list--unless Twitter somehow has a hole in it that allows non-followers to direct-message you, it means that this is a classic security Ponzi scheme: I use the attack to gather the credentials for the people that I'm following directly, then log in and use those credentials to attack their followers, then use those gathered credentials to attack their followers, and so on. Fixing this is also going to be a pain--literally, everybody on Twitter has to change their password, or the scheme can continue with the credentials of those who didn't. (Assuming Twitter doesn't somehow lop the attack off at the knees, for example, by disallowing hyperlinks or something equally draconian.)

We won't even stop to consider what damage might be done if a Twitter-user uses the same password and login name for their Twitter account as they do for other accounts (such as email, banking websites, and so on). If you're one of those folks, you seriously might want to reconsider the strategy of using the same password for all your websites, unless you don't care if they get spoofed.

There's two lessons to be learned here.

One, that as a user of a service--any service--you have to be careful about when and how you're entering your credentials. It's easy to simply get into the habit of offering them up every time you see something that looks familiar, and if supposed "computer experts" (as most of the Twitterverse can be described) can be fooled, then how about the casual user?

Two, and perhaps the more important lesson for those of us who build software, that any time you build a system that enables people to communicate, even when you put a lot of energy into making sure that the system is secure, there's always an angle that attackers will find that will expose a vulnerability, even if it's just a partial one (such as the gathering of credentials here). If you don't need to allow hyperlinks, don't. If you don't need to allow Javascript, don't. Start from the bare minimum that people need to make your system work, and only add new capabilities after they've been scrutinized in a variety of ways. (YAGNI sometimes works to our advantage in more ways than one, it turns out.)

Kudos, by the way, to the Twitter-keepers, who had a message describing the direct-message phishing attack on the Twitter Home page within hours.